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"EVERYTHING PROMISED
HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE WRITING"
INDIAN RESERVE FARMING AND THE SPIRIT AND INTENT
OF TREATY SIX RECONSIDERED

DEREK WHITEHOUSE~STRONG

He continued: "It's as if the white man cannot
be biased, but the Indians might be biased in
their recounting of history."! Interestingly, 120
years before the justice dismissed the Samson
Cree case, the Canadian Department of Indian
Affairs actively sought Indian 2 testimony,
believing that the oral accounts were more
accurate than its own written records.
In the mid-1880s, the Department of Indian
Affairs launched an investigation into claims
by Indian signatories to Treaty Six that the
government was not honoring its treaty commitments. Because its own records were flawed,
the department instructed its employees to
gather Indian recollections and oral testimonies and relied on this information when it
concluded that some treaty obligations did
remain unfilled. However, when Indian signatories in the same period claimed that the
text of Treaty Six did not accurately reflect the
spirit and intent of the negotiations and did
not record all the obligations that they had
extracted from the government, the department did not seek Indian testimony to verify or
refute the charges; rather, it relied solely upon
its written records and it rejected the claims
outright. Analyses of the spirit and intent of

In December 2005, a Canadian federal court
justice dismissed a six-hundred-million-dollar
claim by the Samson Cree related to alleged
mismanagement of its energy royalties. In
newspaper interviews, a lawyer for the Samson
Cree expressed disbelief and stated that the
justice "discounted the testimony of our elders"
and "followed essentially the word of the white
man and the written word of the white man."
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Derek Whitehouse-Strong received his BA (1991)
and MA (1996) from the University of Alberta and
his PhD in History from the University of Manitoba
(2004). In addition to teaching post-secondary classes
in Canadian History at Grant MacEwan College in
Edmonton, Alberta and through Distance Education
at the University of Manitoba, he works as a research
consultant and has written analytical papers for several
First Nations and for Indian and Northern Affairs
Canada.

[GPQ 27 (Winter 2007): 25-37]
25

26

GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, WINTER 2007

Treaty Six must recognize that the Department
of Indian Affairs' selective use of Indian recollections and oral testimonies in the late nineteenth century reinforced both contemporary
and current divergent understandings and
perspectives about the spirit and intent of that
document. 3
NEGOTIATION OF TREATY SIX: DICHOTOMY
OF INTENT

Events leading up to the negotiation of
Treaty Six, and the negotiation itself, show
that a dichotomy existed between the goals
that the Canadian government and the Indian
peoples hoped to achieve with the treaty. The
Canadian government wanted to use the treaty
process to facilitate peaceful Euro-Canadian
settlement of western Canada by extinguishing Indian title to the land and establishing
a reserve system.4 It also believed that reserve
agriculture and Euro-Canadian academic and
religious instruction would mitigate the impact
that disappearing bu(falo herds and advancing
Euro-Canadian settlement would have on the
Indian peoples of the prairies as well as hasten
their absorption into Euro-Canadian society. 5
Although land pressures were the primary
motivators behind the Canadian government's
decision to treat with various bands, its limited
annual budget and the national preoccupation
with constructing a transcontinental railway
limited its ability to act. 6 The government
therefore entered into treaty negotiations only
when it deemed it necessary. Indeed, in 1871,
when several of the bands that eventually
signed Treaty Six expressed "feeling[s] of discontent and uneasiness" about their changing
social and economic conditions and requested
a treaty, the government declined.7 The government entered into discussions several years
later, only after separate groups of Cree threatened to disrupt survey and telegraph crews. 8
The text of Treaty Six was determined during
negotiations at Fort Carlton and was agreed to
on August 23, 1876: all subsequent adhesions
required that signatories agree to the original
text and the original obligations.9

While the Canadian government entered
into Treaty Six negotiations to facilitate EuroCanadian settlement and the economic and
cultural absorption of the Indian populations,
Indian negotiators intended to use the clauses
contained in the treaty to protect their cultures
and economies from the effects of settlement
pressures and of diminishing buffalo herds.
Chief Ahtukukkoop,10 one of the main negotiators of Treaty Six, commented that
[w]e have always lived and received our
needs in clothing, shelter, and food from the
countless multitudes of buffalo that have
been with us since the earliest memory of
our people. No one with open eyes and open
minds can doubt that the buffalo will soon
be a thing of the past. Will our people live
as before when this comes to pass? No! They
will die and become just another memory
unless we find another way.ll
Indeed, Ahtukukkoop pointed out that "[t]he
mother earth has always given us plenty with
the grass that fed the buffalo. Surely we Indians
can learn the ways of living that made the
whiteman strong."12
For Ahtukukkoop and his fellow negotiators, "the ways of living that made the white
man strong" were rooted in agricultural production, and they expected to use Treaty Six
to transition their hunting-based economy to
one based on farming in a reserve context. In
making this transition, they were not content
merely to survive in a subsistence lifestyle.
Several years before the negotiations at Fort
Carlton, future Treaty Six commissioner W.
J. Christie informed Cree representatives that
when they did sign a treaty with the government they could expect to be treated "most liberally" and that they would become "well off."13
Indian negotiators at Fort Carlton therefore
expected that the obligations that they secured
under treaty would allow reserve populations
to remain culturally independent from EuroCanadian society and to compete successfully
in the agricultural economy of the Canadian
prairies.
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FIG. 1. Treaty with Saskatchewan Crees, 1876. Courtesy of Glenbow Archives, NA-1315-19,
Glenbow Museum, Calgary, Alberta.
To ensure that the government addressed
their concerns, the Cree chiefs actively prepared for the discussions held at Fort Carlton. 14
They were well aware of the intricacies involved
in translating from one language into another,
and rather than relying on individuals whom
the government selected and employed, they
hired Peter Erasmus as their interpreter. 15
Consequently, when the government's representatives informed the chiefs that federal
interpreters would work at the proceedings
and that Erasmus's services were not required,
Mistowasis (who was another senior negotiator)
cautioned, "I know what it takes to interpret,"
and threatened to leave if Erasmus was not
permitted to translate.!6 Erasmus proved to be
so superior to the government's own interpreters (Peter Ballendine and treaty commissioner
Reverend John A. Mackay)!7 that shortly into
the negotiations Morris hired him to serve as
the "chief interpreter, being assisted by the
others."!8
For their part, the Indian negotiators who
were present at Fort Carlton in August 1876
agreed to
promise and engage that they will in all
respects obey and abide by the law, and they
will maintain peace and good order between
each other, and also between themselves and
other tribes of Indians, and between themselves and others of Her Majesty's subjects,

whether Indians or whites, now inhabiting
or hereafter to inhabit any part of the said
ceded tracts, and that they will not molest
the person or property of any inhabitant
of such ceded tracts, or the property of
Her Majesty the Queen, or interfere with
or trouble any person passing or travelling
through the said tracts, or any part thereof;
and that they will aid and assist the officers
of Her Majesty in bringing to justice and
punishment any Indian offending against
the stipulations of this treaty, or infringing
the laws in force in the country so ceded. 19
Further, they agreed to "cede, release, surrender and yield up to the Government of
the Dominion of Canada for Her Majesty the
Queen and her successors forever, all their
rights, titles and privileges whatsoever, to the
lands" defined within the text of the document
and "also all their rights, titles and privileges
whatsoever, to all other lands, wherever situated, in the North-West Territories, or in any
other Province or portion of Her Majesty's
Dominions, situated and being within the
Dominion of Canada."zo
In return for these concessions, the Indian
negotiators demanded "assistance to get established in their new occupation of agriculture,
not only financially, but also in instruction
and management.'>21 The federal government
made several commitments that were designed
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to "encourag[el ... the practice of agriculture"
and that established clear treaty obligations
regarding the provision of money, seeds, implements, tools, and livestock to members of
Indian reserves who were "engaged in cultivating the soil." The Canadian government committed to "lay aside reserves for farming lands
... and other reserves for the benefit of the said
Indians ... provided all such reserves shall not
exceed in all one square mile for each family of
five, or in that proportion for larger or smaller
families." As well, the government agreed
to establish "schools for instruction in such
reserves hereby made, as to [Hl er Government
of the Dominion of Canada may seem advisable, whenever the Indians of the reserve shall
desire it.,,22
While these and other considerations were
similar to those that had been agreed to under
the terms of Treaties Three, Four, and Five,
they did not fully address the needs and concerns of the Indian negotiators at Fort Carlton.
Treaty Six was finali<:ed only once they had
extracted additional considerations that they
believed would ensure not only their cultural,
economic, and physical survival but also their
ability to prosper in the same economy as EuroCanadian farmers who settled in the West. The
federal negotiators in turn agreed to these same
concessions on the grounds that they would
"help them [the Indiansl to cultivate the soil,"
thereby facilitating the goal of opening the
prairie region to peaceful Euro-Canadian settlement. 23
The Indian negotiators, for example, secured
a promise from the government to provide economic assistance should they be "overtaken by
any pestilence, or by a general famine."24 They
demanded this provision because they were
concerned about "the ignorance of Indians in
commencing to work the land,,25 and about
their fate should their crops or other means of
sustenance (including the rapidly disappearing
buffalo herds) fail.2 6 Indeed, Mistowasis cautioned the federal representatives that "[tlhis is
no trivial matter with us.'>27
Indian negotiators also recognized that
because reserve farmers would have to devote

significant amounts of time and energy to
plowing, seeding, and cultivating the land, they
would have limited ability to hunt and trap in
the spring.28 The negotiators therefore insisted
that the government provide reserve farmers
with a secure source of "food in the spring."29
Believing that this concession would assist
treaty signatories in making the transition to
reserve agriculture, the Canadian government
agreed to provide one thousand dollars a year
for three years for "the purchase of provisions
for the use of such of the band as are actually settled on the reserves and are engaged
in cultivating the soil, to assist them in such
cultivation.,,30 Moreover, federal negotiators
agreed that band members who were "actually
engaged in farming land on the reserves . . .
would be at liberty to hunt and trap on government lands the same as before" and emphasized
that the "things they would be getting would be
a present on top of what they had before.,,31
Treaty Six Indian negotiators also succeeded
in increasing the government's tool, implement, and livestock obligations. At the start of
the talks, Governor Morris offered to distribute
the same numbers and proportions of animals
and goods as called for by Treaty Three. 32 The
Indian negotiators at Fort Carlton, however,
demanded additional considerations; they
believed that the government's initial offer was
insufficient to allow them to develop reserve
agricultural systems that could survive and
succeed when competing with Euro-Canadian
farmers in the new prairie economy. Morris
agreed to those requests that he believed would
"encourage their desire to settle."33 Treaty Six
therefore included the following provisions:
to any band of the said Indians who are now
cultivating the soil, or who shall hereafter
commence to cultivate the land, that is
to say: Four hoes for every family actually
cultivating; also, two spades per family as
aforesaid; one plough for every three families, as aforesaid, one harrow for every three
families as aforesaid; two scythes, and one
whetstone and two hay forks and two reaping-hooks for every family as aforesaid; and
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also two axes, and also one cross-cut saw,
and also one hand-saw, one pit-saw, the necessary files, one grindstone and one auger
for each band; and also for each Chief, for
the use of his band, one chest of ordinary
carpenter's tools; also for each band, enough
of wheat, barley, potatoes and oats to plant
the land actually broken up for cultivation
by such band; also for each band, four oxen,
one bull and six cows, also one boar and
two sows, and one handmill when any band
shall raise sufficient grain therefor; all the
aforesaid articles to be given once for all for
the encouragement of the practice of agriculture among the Indians. 34
Thus, while both negotiating parties saw
Treaty Six as a means of encouraging and
developing reserve agriculture, they differed
markedly about the ends that were desired. The
Canadian government expected the treaty to
facilitate the economic and cultural absorption
of the Indian signatories into Euro-Canadian
society; the Indian signatories saw the treaty
as a tool to help them maintain their cultural
identities and develop a successful reserve-based
agricultural system that would enable them to
maintain their economic independence in the
face of Euro-Canadian settlement.
TRANSLATION AND SIGNING
OF TREATY SIX

Despite the fact that the federal treaty party
also employed Peter Erasmus to interpret during
the Treaty Six negotiations, the Cree chiefs
continued to express confidence in his honesty
and ability, and invited him to attend their
private councils. 35 Indeed, while some Cree
negotiators accepted Morris's word that all the
points they had raised with the treaty commissioners were included in the written text
of Treaty Six, others were more cautious and
relied on Erasmus for verification. Mistowasis
requested that Erasmus "keep a close watch on
the wording to see that it included everything
that had been promised." Erasmus informed
Mistowasis "that everything promised had

been included in the writing" and with this
assurance Mistowasis signed the document. 36
Although Erasmus was the lead translator
during the negotiations, the government's
records show that Ballendine, Mackay, James
McKay, and W. J. Christie also served as
translators for the federal treaty party.37 Their
responsibilities included "watching how the
answers [to questions raised by the Indian
negotiators] were rendered [by Erasmus], and
correcting when necessary." They confirmed
that "[t]he Crees accepted the revised proposals [after the] ... treaty was interpreted to
them carefully, and was then signed, and the
payment made in accordance therewith."38
At Fort Pitt, Morris continued the pattern
of promoting reserve agriculture as the best
means of ensuring the physical and economic
survival of Indian peoples in the Treaty Six
area, and he offered to teach the Cree "the
cunning of the white man."39 Arguing that the
economic future of the prairie region was tied
to the success of settled agriculture, Morris
noted that the Numbered Treaties provided the
means and opportunities for Indian signatories
to compete in that economy. He recounted
how
we had come at their own r~quest, and
that there was now a trail leading from
Lake Superior to Red River, that I saw it
stretching on thence to Fort Ellice, and
there branching off, the one track going
to Qu'Appelle and Cyprus Hills, and the
other by Fort Pelly to Carlton, and thence I
expected to see it extended, by way of Fort
Pitt to the Rocky Mountains; on that road
I sawall the Chippewas and Crees walking,
and I saw along it gardens being planted and
houses built. I invited them to join their
brother Indians and walk with the white
men on this road.40
Morris then offered the Indian peoples who
had gathered at Fort Pitt "the same terms" as
had been agreed to at Fort Carlton.41
Erasmus (now in the sole employ of the federal treaty party) and his assistants explained
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the terms of the treaty to the Indian negotiators at Fort Pitt, and the negotiators themselves acknowledged that Mistowasis and
Ahtukukkoop would have acted in the best
interests of their peoples. Furthermore, when
Chief James Seenum attempted to expand on
the treaty obligations, Morris informed him
and the other chiefs and headmen who were
in attendance that it was not in his power "to
add clauses to this treaty." The text of Treaty
Six that was negotiated and translated at Fort
Carlton could not be changed by subsequent
signatories.42
The treaty talks at Fort Pitt, however,
revealed that the federal interpreters were not
capable of accurately conveying some of the
subtleties within Indian speeches. At Fort Pitt,
Chief Big Bear expressed concern that the
declining buffalo herds threatened his people's
hunting economy and that the loss of their
main source of sustenance would mean the end
of their freedom. The federal interpreter (possibly Reverend John A. Mackay)43 translated
Big Bear's speech to Morris as a request to "save
me from what I most dread, that is: the rope to
be about my neck (hanging)." This translation
caused the Canadian officials to view Big Bear
in a very negative light, and led Morris to chastise him and suggest that "[tlhe good Indian
need never be afraid" to have "the rope about
his neck.'>!4
Historian Hugh A. Dempsey, however, has
shown that Big Bear's concern was not the
fear of hanging but rather of being leashed.
Big Bear used the metaphor of having a rope
about his neck to highlight his concerns that
the destruction of the buffalo would diminish
the ability of his people to live and act freely.45
It was in this context that Big Bear called for
the protection of the remaining herds so "that
there may be enough for all.'>!6
Indeed, Morris himself later informed his
superiors that the subject of preserving the buffalo "was constantly pressed on my attention
by the Indians" during the Treaty Six negotiations. Believing that "a few simple regulations
would preserve the herds for many years,"
Morris "promised [them] that the matter would

be considered by the North-West Council.'>!7
Thus, when Morris answered Big Bear's request
"that there be no hanging" with the response
that "[tlhe Queen's law punishes murder with
death, and your request cannot be granted,"
the chief (who was not aware that an error in
translation had occurred and who likely was
confused by the governor's response) took this
to mean that the government would help to
protect the buffalo. He informed Morris that the
chiefs who were present at the Fort Pitt negotiations "will help us to protect the buffalo, that
there may be enough for all. I have heard what
was said, and I am glad we are to be helped.'>!8
In a separate incident, a third party informed
Peter Erasmus that Chief Seenum had misunderstood the amount of land that he and
his people were entitled to under the terms of
Treaty Six and that he had signed the Treaty
Six document not realizing this error. 49
Thus, the government's translators experienced some difficulty in accurately conveying
the terms, spirit, and intent of the negotiating
parties. For the federal treaty party, the impact
of errors in translation was not necessarily
severe: the government could and did refer to
the text of the treaty (which was written in
English) if any issues or concerns arose. For the
Indian negotiators, however, the consequences
of faulty and inadequate translations were
more dire: because most neither spoke nor read
English fluently, they relied on interpreters to
accurately convey to them the exact wording,
meaning, and intent of the negotiations and of
the treaty text.
TERMS, SPIRIT, AND INTENT OF TREATY SIX:
DIVERGENCE OF UNDERSTANDING

This reliance on interpreters and the
recording of the treaty terms and proceedings in a written language that was foreign
to one of the two main negotiating parties
led to a divergence in the understandings of
the terms, spirits, and intent of Treaty Six.
When the Indian and federal parties signed
Treaty Six, they believed that the agreed upon
amounts and types of livestock, implements,
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and tools would be sufficient to allow Indian
farmers to adapt successfully to a reserve-based
agricultural system. Nevertheless, they were
aware that the needs of reserve farmers might
increase or change as they shifted their attention toward agriculture and away from hunting,
trapping, and fishing. Indian negotiators signed
Treaty Six with the belief that the Canadian
government had "pledged itself to put them in
the same position as the white man" and that it
would (if necessary) adjust the treaty obligations
to achieve this goal. 50 Indeed, Ahtukukkoop
raised this point during the initial treaty negotiations at Fort Carlton and requested that band
members "be helped when they settle" and that
the government give them "proportionate help
as they advanced in civilization."51
While the written records do not show
Governor Morris addressing this point during
treaty negotiations, he did commit the government to "give them provisions to aid them while
cultivating, to the extent of one thousand dollars per annum, but for three years only"; he
expected that after three years, Indian farmers would be established and "able to support
themselves."52 Morris also pledged, however,
that "you need not concern yourselves so much
about what your grand-children are going to
eat; your children will be taught, and then they
will be as well able to take care of themselves as
the whites around them."53
While Morris specifically was referring
to the provision of schools, Erasmus and the
Indian negotiators viewed the statement in
the context of reserve agriculture. Of the same
conversation, Erasmus recalled Morris saying,
"You will get the seed and you need not concern yourselves about what your children will
eat. They will be taught and able to look after
themselves."54 The governor's words thus confirmed the Cree belief that the terms of Treaty
Six were not geared toward promoting subsistence level agricultural production; rather, they
were to provide Indian farmers, their children,
and subsequent generations with the means of
becoming "well off."
This divergence of understanding is important, because historian Sarah Carter has shown

that Treaty Six obligations proved to be wholly
inadequate for the large-scale dry-farming
methods that many Euro-Canadian farmers
adopted once they became familiar with local
soil and climate conditions. 55 Indeed, less than
five years after the signing of Treaty Six, Indian
commissioner Edgar Dewdney suggested that if
Indian farmers were to succeed, they required
much greater assistance than written treaty
terms provided. In 1881, he reported that "[tlhe
want of more teams and implements is felt by
the Indians from one end of the territory to the
other" and that "it is found that the number of
cattle and implements promised by the treaty
is insufficient." Dewdney believed that even
though Treaty Six was "a little more liberal"
than the earlier Numbered Treaties, its terms
were not sufficient to promote the type of
reserve agriculture and the level of independence that the Canadian and Indian framers of
the treaty had intended. Consequently, in addition to recommending that the government
give Indian farmers more animals than were
called for under written the terms of Treaty
Six, he also suggested adopting a broader policy
of providing one plow to each family "who
satisfied the Agent that by their industry they
could become [settled and independentl."56
The government's own officials confirmed
that "[ilt will be necessary in order to give the
Indians a fair chance to earn their living by
farming to furnish them with more oxen than
are stipulated for in the Treaty.,,57 The department therefore agreed to "liberally assis [tl"
individuals and families by providing them
with larger quantities and different types of
tools 'and livestock than were called for under
the terms of Treaty Six. 58
Several chiefs, however, charged that the
government had failed to honor even those
promises that were expressly stated in the
written terms of Treaty Six. In the decade
that followed the negotiations at Fort Carlton,
Antoine of the Chipewyans of Heart Lake
frequently demanded that the Department of
Indian Affairs distribute quantities of implements and livestock that were outstanding. 59
Chief Seenum and his councillors also accused
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FIG. 2. Fort Carlton. Courtesy of Glenbow Archives, NA-675-1, Glenbow Museum,
Calgary, Alberta.

the department of riot honoring treaty obligations, and six years after he signed the treaty he
informed Indian inspector T. P. Wadsworth that
"we were told that every 3 families should have
one plough, but we are far short of that.'>60
Moreover, the Indian farmers themselves
recognized that the treaty provisions were
not suited to the realities of farming in the
Canadian prairies. Because they had signed
Treaty Six with the expectation that as their
farming needs evolved, so too would the equipment provided by the government, Mistowasis,
Ahtukukkoop, and other Cree chiefs informed
the department that they had "grievances to
consult over." In 1884, the chiefs asked that
"all Treaty provisions should be fulfilled." They
listed numerous instances where they believed
that the government had not honored its written treaty obligations, including
• that "the cattle given them are insufficient for them to gain their livelihood"
• that the government should replace the
work oxen and cows that it had provided
because they were not suited to farm work

• that the horses and wagons provided
were not suited for use as personal conveyances for chiefs
• that when treaty adherents experienced
hunger and destitution, the government
had failed to provide "liberal assistance" as
required under the terms of Treaty Six. 6l
The chiefs also claimed that "there is not
enough of anything supplied to them to enable
all to farm." Consequently, they stated that
because the government "told [them] that they
would see how the white man lived, and would
be taught to live like him," and because "the
Govmt pledged itself to put them in the same
position as the white man," the government
should provide Indian farmers with "threshing
mills, mowers, reapers, and rakes" similar to
those used by Euro-Canadian farmers. 62
THE DEPARTMENT'S SELECTIVE USE OF
ABORIGINAL TESTIMONY

When presented with these charges, Indian
Affairs officials requested that their agents
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in the field determine if the department had
provided livestock, implements, and tools in
sufficient quantities to fulfill federal treaty
obligations. 63 Even before local Indian agents
submitted their replies, however, the superintendent general informed the Indian commissioner that "so far as the actual quantity and
description of implements as well as of food
given to them and the value of the same are
concerned, they have received very much more
than the Treaty ever intended that they should
receive."64
Federal officials, however, had neither a
valid nor a defensible basis for making this
statement. For contemporaries in the nineteenth century, tracking the implements and
livestock that had been distributed toward
fulfilling the government's treaty obligations
was an imprecise endeavour at best. Indian
agents and farm instructors often proved incapable of keeping accurate records 65 and many
failed to submit their returns and reports on
time or even at al1. 66 Furthermore, the government acknowledged that "for many reasons"
its "system of recording cattle &c." was "most
imperfect" because it had "gradually developed,
as the requirements of the service have been
discovered."67 The lists of "Appropriations"
and "Expenditures" that appeared in the
Department of Indian Affairs' annual reports,
for example, reported what implements, tools,
and livestock were distributed at the treaty
level, but they rarely identified specific reserves
as receiving specific treaty obligations. 68 As
a result, department officials admitted that it
would be "very difficult" to generate any sort of
report that accurately tabulated this information. 69
The government thus was aware of significant limitations and shortcomings in its
recordkeeping system and acknowledged that
it was not in a position to provide a satisfactory
response to mounting criticisms that it was
not fulfilling its obligations. In 1883, federal
officials therefore recommended that Indian
commissioner Dewdney "send in a statement
showing the different Bands in that Treaty
[Treaty Six] among which the said cattle &c.

have been distributed as well as a statement
showing what things are still due to those
Indians under Treaty stipulations & also the
articles which have been given over and above
those promised by Treaty."7o One year later,
in response to the aforementioned charges
leveled by Mistowasis, Ahtukukkoop, and the
other Cree chiefs, the superintendent general
of Indian Affairs wrote that "I should be glad
to be informed of the result of his [Dewdney's]
enquiries as regards each of the matters of complaint ... in so far as the same form part of the
stipulations contained in the Treaty made with
these Indians."71
By 1885, however, Dewdney informed the
superintendent general of Indian Affairs that
because many of the records that detailed
which Treaty Six bands had received what
treaty obligations were "inaccurate," it would
be necessary to "visit ... each band of Indians
and [make] close enquiries ... among them.'>72
He observed from past experience that when
"making enquiries from the Indians over a cup
of tea and a pipe of tobacco they could recall
nearly all issues to their memory, that is of the
cattle, horses and larger articles such as plows,
harrows, etc:-of course as to axes, hoes and
such like more difficulty was experienced."73
Dewdney thus placed as great, if not greater,
stock in the oral histories and personal recollections of Indian peoples with respect to
treaty obligations than he did in the written
records of his own department. He informed
the superintendent general that he hoped that
this personal investigation, combined with the
information that was "already on hand will no
doubt enable me to complete a return which
will prove satisfactory to the Department."74
In the fall of 1885, representatives of the
Department of Indian Affairs were able to meet
with the chiefs and headmen of the Treaty Six
bands. As Dewdney had foreseen, all parties
reached a consensus about what "[i]mplements,
tools, cattle, &c." the inhabitants of the
Indian reserves "had received from the Indian
Department" up to and including December
31, 1884.75 While these returns showed that
many Treaty Six bands in fact had received
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their full allotment of treaty tools, implements,
and livestock,76 they also showed that in a
large number of situations the government in
fact had not fulfilled its treaty obligations.?7
Moreover, department officials admitted that
some of the implements that had been distributed in fulfillment of treaty obligations were of
inferior quality.78
In addition to investigating the claims
that Indian signatories to Treaty Six had not
received their allotted treaty tools, implements,
and livestock, the department also responded
to the suggestions that the government had
"pledged itself to put ... [the Indians] in the
same position as white men, and that therefore
they should be given threshing mills, mowers,
reapers and rakes" and that "a living by agriculture was promised them (the Indians).,,79
Referring directly "to the Treaty and to the
negotiations as officially reported that took
place when the Treaty was being concluded,"
the superintendent general stated that "I cannot
find that any of t~ promises claimed under
these heads were really made to the Indians,,8o
and considered the case to be closed.
CONCLUSION

According to the letter of the treaty, the
department's position was valid: there were
no clauses within the treaty that required the
government to provide additional or different types or quantities of tools, livestock, and
implements if farming requirements changed.
The department's own written records nevertheless show that Mistowasis, Ahtukukkoop,
and other chiefs signed Treaty Six believing
that the government had committed to helping
them develop successful reserve agricultural
systems and to continuing providing them with
assistance to achieve that end as their needs
changed. The fact that the government merely
consulted the written documents that were
readily available and dismissed their claims
without an in-depth investigation is curious
given its own experiences and practices with
other related contemporary issues. The government, for example, had incorrectly assumed

that the complaints of Seenum, Mistowasis,
Ahtukukkoop, and others that it was not fulfilling obligations that were explicitly stated
in the text of Treaty Six were false; federal
officials later determined through direct interviews with the Indian claimants that some
bands had not received their full allotment of
treaty livestock, tools, and implements. Indeed,
the government's inability to provide accurate
data relating to the distribution of treaty obligations and its reliance on Indian statements
and recollections to provide that information
demonstrated the flawed nature of its own
written records and the value and accuracy of
Indian testimony. It is in this light that one
must view Indian claims that the written text
of Treaty Six does not reflect the true spirit and
intent of the negotiations and does not accurately record all of the concessions that they
had extracted from federal negotiators at Fort
Carlton.
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Author's note: Although the main focus of
this essay is on the Treaty Six area, the impact
of Department of Indian Affairs' policies was felt
throughout the Canadian West. Consequently,
documents relating to Numbered Treaties One
through Five also were reviewed and cited in this
paper. Minor parts of this article are based on an
unpublished paper I prepared for the Enoch Cree
Nation in Alberta and for the law firm of Ackroyd,
Piasta, Roth, and Day in Edmonton, Alberta. All
parties have granted permission to publish part of
that paper in its current form.

1. Judy Monchuk, "Federal Judge Throws Out
Alta.'s Samson Cree Mismanagement Claim,"
Canadian Press, December 6, 2005, < http://www.
canada.com/nationalpost/story.html?id'79f6a785fba4-496e-b758-320576dfe9b5 > (accessed October
15,2006).
2. While I prefer the term "Aboriginal" as more
historically accurate than the term "Indian," I use
the latter term because the subjects of this paper,
individuals who signed Treaty Six, were identified as Indians under the terms of the Indian Act.
Numerous identifiable Indian cultures and economies existed in the Canadian West during the treaty
period. Though Indian cultures reacted differently
to increasing Euro-Canadian settlement and to
changing economic and political environments,

"EVERYTHING PROMISED HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE WRITING" 35

there were common themes in the relations between
the Canadian government and Indian inhabitants
of the prairie region.
3. Some scholars, for example, have observed
that "most of our information on the treaties
has come from written sources which either ultimately are derived from the government or other
parties who had some interest in getting treaties
signed" and that "such sources may be presenting
a one-sided view of the treaties, especially since
Indian people often seem to have very different
opinions on what the treaties mean." Lynn Hickey,
Richard Lightening, and Gordon Lee, "T.A.R.R.
Interview with Elders Program," in The Spirit of the
Alberta Indian Treaties, ed. Richard Price, 3rd ed.
(Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1999),

103.
4. John Leonard Taylor, "Two Views on the
Meaning of Treaties Six and Seven," in Spirit of the

Alberta Indian Treaties, 14-15.
5. Derek Whitehouse, "The Numbered Treaties:
Similar Means to Dichotomous Ends," Past Imperfect
3 (1994): 27-29.
6. Ibid., 27-32. See also J. R. Miller, Skyscrapers

Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian White Relations
in Canada, rev. ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2000), 162.
7. Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with
the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West Territories
(1880; reprint, Calgary: Fifth House, 1991), InDeanna Christensen, Ahtahkakoop: The EPic
Account of a Plains Cree Head Chief, His People, and
their Struggle for Survival, 1816-1896 (Shell Lake, SK:
Ahtahkakoop Publishing, 2000), 147-52.
8. Morris, Treaties of Canada, 168-12.
9. Records of the negotiations that occurred
at Fort Carlton are presented in Morris, Treaties of
Canada, and Peter Erasmus, Buffalo Days and Nights
(Calgary: Fifth House, 1999).
10. Ahtukukkoop also was known as Star Blanket.
See Morris, Treaties of Canada, 356, and Erasmus,
Buffalo Days and Nights, 229. Because the spelling of
his name varies in different sources, the form used
by treaty commissioner Alexander Morris and in
the text of Treaty Six is used in this article.
11. Erasmus, Buffalo Days and Nights, 250. Not
all Indian signatories to Treaty Six depended upon
the buffalo or were involved in the negotiations,
but most recognized that Euro-Canadian settlement would stress other game resources and cause
conflicts over land.
12. Ibid.
13. Christensen, Ahtahkakoop, 148-49, and
Morris, Treaties of Canada, 169.
14. Erasmus, Buffalo Days and Nights, 238.
15. Erasmus was born in 1833 to a Danish-born
father and a mother who was of mixed European

n;

and Cree ancestry. Ibid., xv, 1-5. Erasmus's various
employments as a teacher, guide, hunter, trapper,
and gold miner are also discussed throughout.
16. Ibid., 238. Mistowasis was also known as Big
Child (ibid., 229). Because the spelling of his name
varies in different sources, the form used by treaty
commissioner Alexander Morris and in the text of
Treaty Six is used in this article.
17. Although Morris and some secondary sources
record the spelling of his name as "McKay," the
priest signed his name "Mackay." See the source
materials cited in Derek Whitehouse-Strong,
'''Because I Happen to Be a Native Clergyman': The
Impact of Race, Ethnicity, Status, and Gender on
Native Agents of the Church Missionary Society
in the Nineteenth Century Canadian North-West"
(Ph.D. diss., University of Manitoba, 2004), 308,
319,326.
18. Morris, Treaties of Canada, 196, 178. After
Treaty Six was negotiated and signed, Chiefs
Mistowasis and Ahtukukkoop collected "money from
their Indians" and paid Erasmus a fee of 230 dollars
for his services. Members of the federal treaty party
paid Erasmus sixty dollars. For his services during the
negotiations that were to follow at Fort Pitt, Morris
offered Erasmus a salary of "five dollars a day during
treaty negotiations and a travel allowance." Erasmus,

Buffalo Days and Nights, 255-56.
19. Morris, Treaties of Canada, 355.
20. Ibid., 352. It remains unclear if subsurface,
fish, and game resources were included in the surrender agreement; that topic, however, is beyond the
scope of this paper. See Taylor, "Two Views," 41-45.
Indian perspectives on "what they were giving up
in exchange for government promises" are also discussed in Arthur J. Ray, Jim Miller, and Frank Tough,

Bounty and Benevolence: A History of Saskatchewan
Treaties (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press,
2000), 130-32.
21. Erasmus, Buffalo Days and Nights, 251. In those
areas where their more traditional economic activities Qf hunting, trapping, and gathering remained
strong, however, Indian negotiators did not want to
be forced to give up those pursuits or to be compelled
to live on reserves unless they themselves chose to do
so. Morris, Treaties of Canada, 183.
22. Morris, Treaties of Canada, 352-54.
23. Ibid., 188.
24. Ibid., 354 and 178. See also Erasmus, Buffalo
Days and Nights, 252. Another unique element of
Treaty Six was the medicine chest clause. This
clause is discussed in Whitehouse, "The Numbered
Treaties," 39-40.
25. Erasmus, Buffalo Days and Nights, 252.
26. Morris, Treaties of Canada, 185, 194-95.
27. Erasmus, Buffalo Days and Nights, 252.
Historian Sarah Carter has described some of the

36

GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, WINTER 2007

problems that were associated with prairie farming:
"Crops were often damaged by frost and scourged
by squirrels, gophers, and dogs. Grasshopper
plagues occurred almost annually, after totally
destroying everything but the potato crop." Carter,

Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers and
Government Policy (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1993),42.
28. David Laird to Minister of the Interior,
December 31, 1877, file 8904, vol. 3654, RGlO,
Library and Archives Canada (hereafter cited as
LAC).
29. Morris, Treaties of Canada, 185. See also
Erasmus, Buffalo Days and Nights, 253.
30. Morris, Treaties of Canada, 354-55. In fact,
after the 1876 negotiations, Morris hired Erasmus
to "act for the government in the distribution of
rations and goods in fulfilment of the government's
part of the treaty terms" and to "interpret the treaties to those chiefs who had not yet signed." Thus,
while Indian and federal negotiators employed
Erasmus to translate the initial proceedings at Fort
Carlton, the government was his sole employer at
subsequent Treaty Six meetings. Erasmus, Buffalo

Days and Nights, 261.
31. Erasmus, Buffalo Days and Nights, 253. See
also "Annual Report of the Department of Indian
Affairs for the Year ended 31st December, 1881," in
Canada Sessional Papers, 1882, vol. 15, no. 6, p. 38.
32. Morris, Treaties of Canada, 324.
33. Ibid., 186; Erasmus, Buffalo Days and Nights,
253.
34. Italics in original. Morris, Treaties of Canada,
354. There are minor differences in punctuation
between the version of Treaty Six that appears in
Morris's Treaties of Canada and Copy of Treaty No.

Six between Her Majesty the Queen and the Plain
and Wood Cree Indians and Other Tribes of Indians
at Fort Carlton, Fort Pitt and Battle River with
Adhesions, lAND Publication No. QS-0574-000-EEA-1 (Ottawa, 1964).
35. Erasmus, Buffalo Days and Nights, 245-50.
36. Erasmus, Buffalo Days and Nights, 254. See
also Morris, Treaties of Canada, 196.
37. Morris, Treaties of Canada, 356-57. See also
Erasmus, Buffalo Days and Nights, 237, 242-43.
38. Morris, Treaties of Canada, 178.
39. Ibid., 231.
40. Ibid., 190.
41. Ibid.
42. Erasmus, Buffalo Days and Nights, 259-60, and
Morris, Treaties of Canada, 190.
43. Neither Erasmus nor Morris identify the
person who is serving as the interpreter at this
point, but it was not Erasmus: he had left for
Whitefish Lake. Historian Hugh Dempsey suggests
that "it is likely that the Reverend John McKay [sic]

acted as translator of Big Bear's words," and notes
that Mackay "spoke Swampy Cree, and at Carlton
he had become so confused while translating that
he had been obliged to sit down." Hugh A. Dempsey,
Big Bear: The End of Freedom (Toronto: Douglas and
McIntyre, 1984),74. See also Erasmus, Buffalo Days

and Nights, 240-43.
44. The interpolation of "(hanging)" from the
original. Morris, Treaties of Canada, 240.
45. Dempsey, Big Bear, 74-75. Similar terminology was used during the negotiations of Treaty
Seven. Dempsey notes that "an elderly holy man"
cautioned Indian negotiators of Treaty Seven that
if they signed the treaty, "You won't have your own
free will; the whites will lead you by a halter." Hugh
Dempsey, Treaty Research Report: Treaty Seven,
(Ottawa: Treaties and Historical Research Centre,
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1987), p. 24.
46. Morris, Treaties of Canada, 241.
47. Ibid., 194-95.
48. Ibid., 241. See also Blair Stonechild and Bill
Waiser, Loyal till Death: Indians and the North-West
Rebellion (Calgary: Fifth House, 1997), 24-26, and
Dempsey, Big Bear, 75.
49. Erasmus, Buffalo Days and Nights, 260-63.
50. Indian agent James Ansdell Macrae to Indian
Commissioner, August 25, 1884, file 15,423, vol.
3697, RGlO, LAC. Indian commissioner Edgar
Dewdney forwarded Macrae's report to the superintendent general of Indian Affairs. E. Dewdney
to Superintendent General of Indian Affairs,
September 8, 1884, ibid.
51. Morris, Treaties of Canada, 185-86.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., 213.
54. Erasmus, Buffalo Days and Nights, 252.
Erasmus's account was written nearly fifty years after
the negotiations, but it does provide an alternative
perspective about what the parties agreed to in
1876.
55. Sarah Carter, "Agriculture and Agitation
on the Oak River Dakota Reserve, 1875-1895"
Manitoba History 6 (1983): 5; Carter, Lost Harvests,
170,215-17,234.
56. "Annual Report of the Department of Indian
Affairs for the Year Ended 31st December 1881," in
Canada Sessional Papers, 1882, vol. 15, no. 6, p. 41.
57. Undated "Memo for Sir John" on page titled
"Cattle," file 22,367, vol. 3716, RGlO, LAC. See
also ''Annual Report of the Department of Indian
Affairs for the Year Ended 31st December 1881,"
in Canada Sessional Papers, 1882, vol. 15, no. 6, pp.
xxxiv-xxxv, 41.
58. Ibid., 37. Department policy was that tools,
implements, and livestock that were not treaty
obligations were loaned to individuals, families, and
bands; the government retained ownership of the

"EVERYTHING PROMISED HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE WRITING" 37

items and could distribute or remove them as its representatives saw fit. Hayter Reed to Superintendent
General of Indian Affairs, June 14, 1886, File 30,421,
vol. 3752, RG1O, LAC. See also [?] to E. Dewdney, June
26, 1886, and [?] to Dewdney, July 24, 1886, ibid.
59. Antoine to William Anderson, August 22,
1881, file 33501, vol. 3768, RG1O, LAC.
60. "James Seenum's (Peecan) Account of the
Signing of the Treaty with Governor Morris" as
transcribed by T. P. Wadsworth, October 26, 1883,
file 7542-3, vol. 3640, RG1O, LAC.
61. James Ansdell Macrae to Indian Commissioner, August 25, 1884, file 15,423, vol. 3697, RG1O,
LAC.
62. Ibid.
63. When he prepared his report to Dewdney, for
example, James Ansdell Macrae noted beside each
specific complaint what had been required of the
government under the terms of Treaty Six. See the
marginal notes in ibid. Macrae is assumed to have
written the marginal notes because the handwriting in the margin matches the handwriting in the
report.
64. Superintendent General to E. Dewdney,
December 31, 1884, file 15,423, vol. 3697, RGlO,
LAC. Note also that Hayter Reed reported specifically on the complaints of the Battleford and
Carlton Crees in Hayter Reed, Assistant Indian
Commissioner, to Superintendent General, January
23, 1885, ibid.
65. See, for example, E. Dewdney to Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, February 1,
1884, file 7542-3, vol. 3640, RG1O, LAC; [?] to E.
Dewdney, December 7, 1885, and E. Dewdney to
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, December
24, 1885, File 22,550-2, vol. 3717, RG1O, LAC.
66. E. Dewdney to Superintendent General of
Indian Affairs, January 18, 1884, file 10,917, vol.
3673, RGlO, LAC; Secretary of the Department
of Indian Affairs to Indian Agent Urbain Verreau,
December 7, 1908, Shannon Box 56 (1908-1909),
vol. 10416, RG1O, LAC.
67. Hayter Reed to the Deputy Superintendent
General of Indian Affairs, April 28, 1891, file
73,870, vol. 3846, RG1O, LAC.
68. See "Annual Report of the Department of
Indian Affairs for the Year Ended 31st December
1885," in Canada Sessional Papers, 1882, vol. 19, no.
4, part II, pp. 145-46, 151.
69. Hayter Reed to the Deputy Superintendent
of Indian Affairs, August 15, 1891, file 73,870, vol.
3846, RG1O, LAC. See also John McGirr to Indian
Commissioner Hayter Reed, July 4, 1891, and John
McGirr to the Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs,
July 2, 1891, ibid.
70. Underlining in original. The contemporary spelling "shewing" appeared in the original

document but was altered here to "showing."
Memorandum from J. McGirr to Deputy Minister of
Indian Affairs L. Vankoughnet, December 7, 1883,
file 10,080, vol. 3665, RG1O, LAC. See also [?] to E.
Dewdney, December 15, 1883, ibid.
71. Superintendent General of Indian Affairs
to E. Dewdney, December 31, 1884, file 15,423, vol.
3697, RG1O, LAC.
.
72. E. Dewdney to Superintendent General of
Indian Affairs, January 28, 1885, file 10,080, vol.
3665, RG1O, LAC.
73. E. Dewdney to Deputy Superintendent of
Indian Affairs L. Vankoughnet, February 24, 1885,
file 10,080, vol. 3665, RG1O, LAC.
74. E. Dewdney to Superintendent General of
Indian Affairs, January 28, 1885, file 10,080, vol.
3665, RG1O, LAC. An evaluation of Dewdney's proposal for action can be found in Memorandum from
J. McGirr to Deputy Minister of the Department of
Indian Affairs, February 12, 1885, and in E. Dewdney
to L. Vankoughnet, February 24, 1885, ibid.
75. Undated report for Alexander's Band in file
29488-2, vol. 3743, RGlO, LAC. The documents
were signed in October 1885, but many stated that
the actual lists of tools and implements were for the
period "from the date of entering into Treaty No.6
to December 31st/84." Ibid.
76. See, for example, the undated report for Papastayous' Band in file 29488-2, vol. 3743, RG1O, LAC.
77. The Stony Plain Band, for example, was
owed one boar, two sows, and numerous tools and
implements. Report for the Stony Plain Band in
file 29488-2, vol. 3743, RG1O, LAC. Government
records show that between twenty-seven and thirtyfive families or individuals were involved in cultivating the soil in 1885: these figures are central to
establishing the level of government treaty obligations. See T. P. Wadsworth to E. Dewdney, October
26, 1885, folio page 12, and T. P. Wadsworth to E.
Dewdney, October 26,1885, Table "H," file 22,550-2,
vol. 3717, RG1O, LAC.
78. Hayter Reed to Superintendent General,
January 23, 1885, file 15,423, vol. 3697, RG1O, LAC.
The Department of Indian Affairs did instruct
Indian agents to ensure that all tools, implements,
and foodstuffs supplied by contractors were "equal
to the pattern called for." E. Dewdney to [I], datestamped May 11, 1881, file 29,335, vol. 3742, RG1O,
LAC.
79. J. Macrae to Indian Commissioner, August
25, 1884, file 15,423, vol. 3697, RG1O, LAC. Indian
commissioner Edgar Dewdney forwarded Macrae's
report to the superintendent general of Indian
Affairs. E. Dewdney to Superintendent General of
Indian Affairs, September 8, 1884, ibid.
80. Superintendent General to E. Dewdney,
December 31, 1884, file 15,423, vol. 3697, RG1O, LAC.

